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Not I: An Aborted Autobiography 
Aspasia Velissariou 
Beckett's drama creates a paradoxical situation. It invites a number of 
critical approaches which center on what it obstinately resists: the existence of 
meaning in the text associated with a "person" who, however fragmented, is still 
there as its originator. These approaches do not hesitate to read radical texts such 
as Not I in terms of the same theoretical and methodological premises locating 
a psychological "essence" in texts which call into question this very "essence." 
Not /, in this sense, provides a clear example of the pitfalls that are inherent in 
these essentially psychologistic readings precisely because it raises the problem 
of subjectivity and, specifically, of the subject's relation to language. Thus, it 
calls for a methodological approach which should take account of the subject's 
constitution in and by language as well as of the very nature of writing/speaking. 
Such an attempt can also explain the peculiarities of its stage representation in the 
context of the text's non-commitment to "person" and "meaning." 
Not I explores the boundaries of Western discourse by attempting the 
dissolution of the subject as the locus of presence and the author of meaning. 
Crucial to the textual strategy employed is language as the very terrain of 
sociability. Can language which "teaches the definitions of Man" be used against 
itself? Can therefore the subject "be posited as the place, not only of 
structure . . . but especially of its loss, its outlay?"1 Not /, accordingly, cannot 
be said to be a text "about" experiences meant to be dramatically represented, nor 
"about" itself as a text failing to represent. Not I is simply the text of its own 
writing. Moreover, it is the text of its writing for the theater, it questions the 
nature both of the medium as such and of writing for it. 
In an interview to I. Shenker (New York Times, 6 May 1956) Beckett 
remarked that "anyone nowadays, who pays the slightest attention to his own 
experience finds it the experience of a non-knower, a non-can-er" demarcating his 
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own terrain in the following way: "The kind of work I do is one in which I'm not 
master of my material. . . . I'm working with impotence, ignorance. I don't 
think impotence has been exploited in the past."2 Not I dramatically exposes the 
impotence of Beckett-as-an-author in the act of writing. At the same time, it 
testifies to the power of Beckett-as-a-writer, that is, of someone for whom 
language is a problem,3 but, who, nevertheless, exists within the text. Beckett 
may be the originator of the text but he is not the authority to whom meaning can 
be traced or innocently restored. He is the subject of a discourse which cannot 
utter the linguistic instance "I." In the gap left by the author's disappearance, 
language takes over; freed from the constraints of the authorial text it 
continuously opens up towards a multiplicity of readings always deferring 
meaning. Not /, then, denies the possibility of meaning as a predicate of identity 
and presence, those parameters of personality designating the authorial discourse. 
Moreover, it exposes that state of lack and deprivation in which the writer finds 
himself in the act of writing. It is finally a text which eludes meaning by 
permanantly pointing to its lack. The strategy employed to this end is precisely 
that of the denial of subjectivity. In Not I we are confronted with an impossible 
situation in which the subject of the narration will not recognise itself as the 
"she" of the utterance, nor will it surrender to the "I." Therefore it will 
obstinately refuse to assign the text to its author. 
The subject of the narration (Mouth) loses itself in language and melts into 
speech as if in a flow of raw material. What insistently prevents her narration 
from closing upon itself and thus from becoming "meaningful" is language. 
Language constitutes a problem for Mouth precisely as it does for the modern 
writer, Beckett in this instance.4 Language is experienced by the speaking subject 
in a traumatic way as a negativity since she has already been constituted by it in 
terms of a non-recuperative lack. 
Not I is radically predicated upon a basic tension. Interestingly, this tension 
is not so much engendered by the dramatic text as such; it rather lies in its 
reception by the spectator/reader. It is released at the intersection of his/her 
desire to project an author upon a "writerly"5 narration which contests the very 
nature of the sign, and of the text's resistance to commit itself to the notion of 
"author-ity." The audience's need to "make sense" of Mouth's narration through 
the imposition of a coherent interpretive text on her stream of words is the 
reverse side of its search for an author; somebody who would take the 
responsibility for the text by declaring "it is I who wrote (spoke) it."6 At the 
same time, because the character's "mind" is seen "as the source and guarantee 
of the unitary sense of a given text,"7 the audience's sense of a dramatic event 
derives from the character's perception of it.8 In this case, however, Mouth's 
perception of the narrated events is simply non-existent since the originating 
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consciousness is not there. Mouth refuses the author-ity of both her life and text 
by obsessively holding onto the third person. According to Benveniste every 
language "organises person" in terms of a correlation of personality which 
opposes person (/ or thou) to non-person (he or it), the sign of absence. The 
latter can never reverse itself into person contrary to what happens with the I-thou 
opposition.9 Mouth, by attaching its narration to she, "refuses" to take up the 
position of "person." This would implicitly acknowledge a thou and therefore the 
possibility of communication. Beckett, caught in language in the act of writing 
denies art as communication. He realises that 
there's complete disintegration. No T,' no 'have,' no 'being.' No 
nominative, no accusative, no verb. There is no way to go on. The 
very last thing I wrote—'Textes pour Rien'—was an attempt to get out 
of the attitude of disintegration, but it failed.10 
This "attitude of disintegration" is not external to writing but is inherent in 
it and that is why Beckett was not able to get rid of it.11 Insofar as language can 
no longer be considered a reflection of "necessary" connections between the 
signifier and the signified, it becomes the very space of its own disarticulation. 
Consequently, freed from its obligation to mirror a "meaningful unity" it is for 
Beckett-as-a-writer not a substitute for life but life itself. 
But why is Mouth a "writer"? If a literary work is considered to be about 
language and its subject matter is the "process of speech itself," then Mouth's 
narration is a de-centered text with no meaning; or rather, it is a text which 
constructs its meaning as a process in "its telling itself, its speaking of its own 
existence."12 According to Barthes the text is an activity going to "the limit of 
the rules of enunciation," "experienced in relation to the sign" and achieving 
"plurality of meaning." In contrast with the work it "is read without its father's 
[the author's] guarantee."13 Mouth, like the narrator of Beckett's trilogy, exists 
only in the narration; she "effects" the narration in being "affected" by it. 
Therefore she "writes" in an absolute sense remaining always inside the act of 
narration. Beckett's stage directions at the beginning—"As house lights down 
Mouth's voice unintelligible behind curtain. House lights out, Voice continues 
unintelligible behind curtain. 10 seconds"—and at the end of the piece—"Curtain 
fully down. House dark. Voice continues behind curtain, unintelligible, 10 
seconds, ceases as house lights up"14—draw our attention to narrating as a 
non-stop activity (symbolically) exceeding dramatic time ad infinitum. Here 
narration is a text which, reaching the limit of the rules of enunciation 
(rationality, comprehensibility etc.), refuses closure because this would signify the 
end, the death of Mouth-as-a-narrator. 
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Mouth repeatedly associates silence with death—"all silent as the grave" 
(218), "like numbed . . . couldn't make the sound" (218)—and sounds, words and 
their mental imprints on the mind, with life—"all dead still but the buzzing" 
(219), "practically speechless . . . all her days . . . how she survived! . . ." (219, 
221), "the whole being . . . hanging on its words" (219), "or that time she 
cried . . . since she was a baby . . . must have cried as a baby . . . perhaps 
not. . . not essential to life . . . just the birth cry to get her going . . . breathing" 
(220). There are, however, two opposing forces in operation within the dramatic 
text. On the one hand, silence—"sweet silent as the grave" (210)—would seal 
up Mouth's narration as a closure of meaning. Consequently it would mark her 
as an author, as somebody who is in control of her work. On the other hand, 
for Mouth-as-a-writer the non-stop narrating in a permanent deferring of meaning 
is the only viable strategy for postponing the text's closing in on a privileged 
signified. That, by providing the key to its explanation, would silence the 
narrator. Mouth definitely hangs on to her narration, not in a relation of priority 
and externality to it but as a function within it. Yet, this does not necessarily 
imply the resolving of a certain tension between the process (speaking as such) 
as a self-referential activity and the end-product (meaning). Her text is not void 
of certain crucial signifieds to which the audience might refer so as to make 
'sense' of her narration. Yet, these signifieds exist as a part of Beckett's strategy 
of seducing the audience into believing that this is after all a "personal" testimony 
of the "real" life of Mouth, however fragmented her identity might be.15 
But, if this offering of partial sense is only a reduction, why is her activity 
an essentially autobiographical one, or, what is the meaning of writing her 
life-as-a-text? The author is usually considered to be "the principle of a certain 
unity of writing, all differences having to be resolved, at least in part, by the 
principles of evolution, maturation or influence."16 He/she also represents that 
level on which various contradictions intrinsic to the work are reconciled. 
Transformations or distortions of certain events are "explained" through his/her 
biography. Thus, the life of the author still serves as the privileged guideline to 
the hermeneutics of the work by virtue of its promixity to the "essence." The 
relation between life and work is seen as homologous since the latter constitutes 
the mirror-image of the former, however distorted it may very often be. What 
the work reflects, in parts or as a whole, is the life of the author as an essential 
unity which inscribes in it certain biological characteristics (i.e. youth, 
maturation, old age). The work acquires the attributes of a living organism 
shaped in its Creator's image; it becomes a "physical" extension of the Authorial 
Body, that vast pool of meaning. The severing of the work from that body is 
equal to the amputation of the latter, that is to the dismemberment of the 
organical entity constituted by the dyad, author-work. The premises upon which 
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this entity rests are those of reflection/emanation which by definition exclude 
"process," i.e. the activity of writing. Language as a simple mediator of meaning 
conveyed from the author to the work remains subservient to that essentially 
passive relation. 
Mouth's relation to her narration subverts all the above postulates by 
twisting them against themselves. Her story, instead of reflecting the subject as 
a biological and spiritual entity (the unity of which guarantees its "textual" 
coherence), de-constructs it in the act of speaking it. Mouth's narration provides 
certain biographical "facts," however sketchy and erratic, which could roughly 
correspond to phases of human life—birth: "out. . . into this world . . . tiny little 
thing . . . before its time . . . in a godforsaken hole" (216)—infancy and 
childhood: "no love such as normally vented on the . . . speechless infant . . . in 
the home . . . no love of any kind . . . at any subsequent stage" (216), "brought 
up as she had been to believe. . . with the other wa i f s . . . in a 
merciful. . . God" (217)—maturation and old age: "practically speechless. . . 
all her days . . . how she survived! . . . even shopping . . . supermart. . . middle 
of the throng . . . motionless" (219), "nothing of any note till coming up to sixty 
when—. . . what ? . . . seventy ? . . . good God!" (216). These biographical 
"facts," however, cannot function as the locus of the text's meaning on which its 
hermeneutics could be based because they do not act as a safe repository of 
information. The reason is that Mouth's "text" is radically predicated on a 
dominant ambiguity concerning the nature of subjectivity. Who is the old 
woman of the narration? What is her relation to Mouth? Are they one and the 
same "person"? And if so, why is Mouth violently denying identity? Why does 
she consign it to the third person? What finally constitutes subjectivity, and 
which is the role of language in the construction of the subject? 
The textual contradictions cannot be resolved in reference to the 
psychological and biological person of the author of the specific discourse. 
Mouth constantly decenters her narration. The tactic employed by Beckett is the 
shifting of meaning from the points where it tends to congeal. These points 
coincide with the promising question "What?. . . Who?" but they are instantly 
refuted by the furious reply "no! . . . she!" (217, 219, 221, 222): a question and 
reply addressed to an imaginary Other or to Auditor. Auditor makes four 
movements in response to Mouth's vehement refusal to relinquish the third 
person. In this sense, Auditor's gestures of "helpless compassion" become the 
very signs of the audience's own helplessness in the face of such a denial. The 
attempted construction of a life story collapses at its nodal point: that of life as 
the origin of the text. Life, in this case, cannot function so since the truth of 
Mouth's discourse is not synonymous with subjectivity. It always lies somewhere 
else: in the language which is speaking about itself. Her life "is no longer the 
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origin of [her] fables, but a fable that runs concurrently with [her] work. . . . 
It is the work which affects the life, not the life which affects the work."17 In 
this context, Mouth's narration allows us to read her life-as-a-text, and only in 
this sense can it be considered a "bio-graphy" in accordance with the etymology 
of the word. 
Language writes life, Mouth's life as a deficiency, as a negativity. The lack 
of syntax, the elisions of the objects, the dissolution of speech, the repetitions of 
words do not simply reflect the fragmentation of the subject. They define the 
subject's relation to language as an inherently problematic one. At this point, 
Lacan's theory of the constitution of subjectivity in language could elucidate the 
crucial problem of Mouth's inscription in it as well as the "pathological" form of 
her discourse. Her discourse enacts the tragedy of the subject's entry into what 
Lacan calls the Symbolic order, the stage at which the child constructs its 
subjectivity by its appropriation of language.18 The Symbolic is the linguistic 
system that precedes the subject but at the same time it is constitutive of it. In 
this sense, the child is subject to language as well as subject of it. Prior to 
accession to the Symbolic, however, the child identifies with the mother, or rather 
with the object of her desire, the phallus. The Symbolic father intervenes in the 
mother-child relationship as the representative of the phallus, revealing the 
mother's lack of it and "castrating" the child. Therefore the child's access to 
language is experienced by it as the recognition of its lack of the phallus, which, 
apart from being the object of desire, has also a signifying function. It fixes 
difference according to the symbolic interpretation the child fixes on its presence 
or absence in itself and in the figures of the father and mother. The discovery 
of the missing phallus establishes the child's relationship to absence which moves 
it to speak by seeking to fill in the gap left by the "lack of object" in the 
signifying chain.19 Speech, therefore, is dependent on the notion of lack since it 
is "an attempt to fill the gaps without which speech could not be articulated."20 
Thus, the acquisition of language by the child is equal to the insertion of the 
subject into a structure which is by its nature in opposition to the emotional bond 
with the mother: 
The experience of the mother is one of initial plenitude from which the 
infant is brusquely severed. Thus the separation from the mother 
results in a kind of primal lack . . . , a "gaping" and it is this traumatic 
experience which is customarily felt (by both girls and boys) as a 
castration.21 
Castration used in a metaphorical sense here signifies any inhibition of the 
child's desire for that first essential plenitude. It is crucial therefore in that it 
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introduces absence in the mother-child bond. The child must learn how to deal 
with absence, and the strategy for doing so is the incorporation of absence into 
its life, the structuring of subjectivity on the basis of incompleteness. This is 
very important in an another respect too. If we see language as a system 
organized around that "essential charged absence,"22 which castration is, then the 
subject's acceptance of it becomes preconditional upon its entering into language 
and culture. Mouth's non-stop reiteration of the same events signifies her 
inability to do so by coming to terms with absence and loss as the painful but, 
nevertheless, essential conditions of sociability. 
Her story pivots on three axes which organise narration on the basis of 
binary oppositions. These concern her birth—"out. . . into this world . . . tiny 
little thing . . . before its time . . . what? . . . girl ? . . . yes . . . tiny little 
girl . . . out into this godforsaken hole called . . . no matter . . . parent 
unknown . . . unheard of . . . he having vanished . . . thin air . . . no sooner 
buttoned up his breeches . . . she similarly . . . eight months later . . . so no 
love . . . no love such as normally vented on the speechless infant . . . no love 
of any kind" (216),—her collapse in the field—"coming up to 
seventy . . . wandering in a field . . . looking aimlessly for cowslips . . . to make 
a ball . . . when suddenly . . . all went out. . . all that early April morning 
light . . . found herself in the dark . . . insentient . . . she did not know . . . what 
position she was in!" (216-17)—and that time in court—"guilty or not 
guilty . . . stand up woman . . . speak up woman . . . stood there staring into 
space . . . something she had to tell . . . nothing she could tell" (221). All three 
events are in one way or another, connected with her inability to insert herself 
into language's structure. Speech always exists in relation to an(other). In this 
case the addressee is God. His absence is experienced by the subject as "lack," 
since he is the lost object which Mouth's desire cannot recover.23 God as the 
third person articulates her narration as a tension of oppositions, presence versus 
absence, and lack versus plenitude, which are felt to be absolute and thus 
irreconcilable. 
At first sight deprivation and negativity seem to occupy entirely Mouth's 
fragmented speech to the exclusion of other "positive" terms. It is predicated 
upon repeated negations—"no sound," "no matter," "no movement," "no 
screaming," "no idea,"—upon verbs in negative form or with a negative 
meaning—"she didn't know," "nothing she could tell," "nothing she could think," 
"doesn't recognize," "she can't stop," "disconnected," "vanished," "delude 
herself—and finally upon words or phrases implying loss or 
deprivation—"speechless," "powerless," "motionless," "painless," "waifs," 
"unheard," "unknown," "thin air," "half-open mouth." However, Mouth's "text" 
literally hinges on the third person, God, who is "good," "merciful," who is love, 
52 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
"God is love." The elision of the direct objects in Mouth's narration signifies "the 
syntactic recognition of an impossible object"24 which in this case is God as the 
object of love. God may be love but for Mouth there is "no love," "no love of 
any kind." Therefore God (love) is the impossible object for the "speaking subject 
lacking any object of signification and/or love."25 For Lacan the discovery of the 
lack of object is the condition and cause of desire. Yet the pathological search 
for the lost object lies at the root of neurosis which is the Utopian quest for a lost 
plenitude.26 Mouth's ironical references to God as love signify her inability to 
incorporate loss in the structuring of her desire and speech. 
The third person to whom Mouth refers, therefore, does not coincide with 
the "she" of the narration, but it is "he" (God), the sign of absence. Indeed, 
Mouth's disavowal of identity can only be explained by the subject's deprivation 
of the desired object (God is no love for Mouth), who, in an effort to alleviate 
the pain caused by its absence—"brought up as she has been to believe . . . with 
the other waifs . . . in a merciful . . . (brief laugh) . . . God (good laugh)" 
(217)—ascribes it to a third person ("she"). The "she" of the narration, however, 
does not always conceal the "I" of Mouth; nor does it effectively screen the 
subject from suffering. If the strategy of the subject's concealment under the 
guise of "she" were entirely successful, then Beckett's direction as to Mouth's 
vehement refusal to abandon the third person would be out of place; so would be 
Mouth's scream at the painful memory of "she"'s collapse in the fields. The 
reason lies at a deeper level. Mouth's suffering is not of a psychological nature 
in that it does not originate in events external to her being constituted in 
language. On the contrary, it inheres in it and is reproduced by it through 
speaking as a painful but compulsive activity. 
At the same time her position in language raises the problem of gender. 
She is constituted in it and by it as a female subject. Beckett's choice for the 
feminine is not accidental. Thus I would contest Vivian Mercier's statement that 
"by putting 'boy' for 'girl' and changing the gender of the pronouns, Not F could 
become a monologue for male voice" and its amendment that "technical 
considerations may have had more to do with the choice of sex: women do speak 
faster than men and scream more readily . . . while only a heavily made-up (and 
therefore feminine) mouth would be visible."27 Beckett's choice, far from 
resulting from "technical considerations" such as the above (which, anyway, rely 
heavily on traditional notions of gender) is already inscribed in the logic of 
patriarchy. This identifies language with rationality as the very foundations of 
the discursive order. It also defines the feminine as a difference from the 
masculine norm which guarantees the coherence of structure: it becomes the locus 
of its loss. The image that Beckett employs implicity associates Mouth with the 
vagina. Mouth as "a large, gaping vagina"28 becomes the striking image of the 
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female subject's relation to language. Woman, reduced to her sex which is 
perceived as a "gap," can only utter her difference from the "norm." 
The text draws our attention to the female genitals through an ambiguous 
reference to Mouth's birth into a "godforsaken hole." It associates femininity with 
a "hole," and projects the image of the mouth as its physical duplicate. Mouth 
talks about a "tiny little thing" and then corrects it for "tiny little girl" (girl as a 
thing) born "before her time" into a "godforsaken hole called . . . no matter" (hole 
is no matter29) by parents "unknown" (parents as absence). What follows soon 
after is the crucial reference to love and God as signifier of plenitude the absence 
of which fixes her into a state of lack. Here it is worth noting the linking of the 
absence of love with the inability to speak underlined by the tautological 
reference to the "speechless infant" (infans = speechless). 
This results in dis-order at the level of language. Mouth's unfulfilled desire 
for God/love emerges as an interruption and fragmentation of ordered discourse. 
Yet her speech creates a different type of structure which takes the rhythm of her 
repressed desire. It is as if desire "writes" Mouth's text on the basis of 
quasi-musical structures which through repetition deny closure.30 Words literally 
fall outside Mouth in an almost physical discharge: "sudden urge 
to . . . t e l l . . . then rush out stop the first she saw . . . nearest lavatory . . . start 
pouring it out. . . steady stream . . . mad stuff (222). Words as a body 
discharge are associated with the image of Mouth-as-vagina and with the tears 
which wet her palm. Words therefore take up the quality of the female body and 
its secretions.31 They inscribe femininity in language as the locus of 
heterogeneity and incoherence, the very loss of logocentric structure. Inevitably 
Mouth perceives her identity in language in negative terms as permanently 
incomplete, as other than what she is. Thus her displacement of identity is 
intrinsic to the constitution of her subjectivity. Since the latter is not 
"syntactically" organised the produced "text" cannot be either. It can only be 
fragmented, open-ended and fluid precisely like Mouth's body which exists in 
disarticulation and displacement. 
Despite the disarticulation of the speaking subject Mouth's text remains 
autobiographical since the "she" of the narration could be replaced, at least 
theoretically, by the "I."32 Even if the first person narrative were used, her 
"writing" would still be carried out on the basis of her splitting as a writer into 
the subject of enunciation (writer) and the subject of utterance (character). The 
"I," however, is rejected because it conceals effectively that splitting which is 
intrinsic to the act of writing (subject of utterance = subject of enunciation). The 
"she" is adopted precisely because it makes it more prominent by positing the 
writer in the domain of absence: 
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The subject of narration (S) is drawn in, and therefore reduced to a 
code, to a non-person, to an anonymity (as writer, subject of 
enunciation) mediated by a third person the he/she character, the 
subject of utterance.33 
Mouth erases all the signs of her individuality through the use of "she" to which 
moreover she denies any relation. By doing so she takes up the subject's 
alienation, intrinsic to the verbal expression, to its utmost limits: to the absolute 
alienation of the subject from herself. 
In this case, however, the disappearance of the subject of enunciation to the 
benefit of the third person calls into question the premises upon which narration 
rests: the speaking subject's unity and identity. And yet Mouth's text is not 
entirely consistent with its negativity. It contains a tension between its 
continuous references to God, as the "truth" of the subject and the subject's 
non-commitment to such a notion. Her vocabulary largely consists of words the 
use of which implies the identity between language and thought. She "thought," 
"realized," "understood," "reasoned," tried "to make sense" of "words," 
"message," "proof," "notion," "idea," "brain," "mind." "Suffering" is associated 
with the "notion of punishment" for a "sin" "She" might have committed, and 
shame with purgation, and all these notions with God as love. It is these fissures 
in the text which tempt the audience to impose a coherent narrative structure on 
it by projecting a psychological "person" on Mouth. The story that the audience 
may construct is one of sin, punishment and suffering of Mouth, who despite her 
fragmentation, is still there as the originator of meaning. Mouth's text, however, 
resists its assignment to an author because God cannot function as the truth of the 
subject. The punishment inflicted by Him for "no particular reason" disarticulates 
the attempted coherence from within. God is no reason since he cannot function 
as that absolute signified upon which the text could finally close. Thus Mouth's 
text remains open-ended recounting for ever the trauma, but at the same time the 
pleasure released upon her by the collapse of the Absolute. 
Not /, the incomplete statement of a disintegrating subject, the solipsistic 
utterance of a language at a loss with itself, can only underscore the bankruptcy 
of the author's relation to his work. Failure, though, becomes a new occasion for 
the writer who, by putting his expresssive means at stake, infringes upon the 
accepted artistic codes which rely on closure. Beckett, by making language not 
only the means, but the very object of his writing, focuses on the crisis of the 
subject's relation to language. The latter can no longer be synonymous with an 
"act" carried out by a unitary subject, prior and external to it. Mouth's inability 
to say "This is I" signifies the subject's impossible task to make predicative 
statements which express a certainty of meaning. Mouth's denial of identity can 
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therefore be understood in the light of Beckett's refusal to say "it is thus," that 
is, to consent to a meaning. 
Yet meaning in the theatre is associated with presence. An object exists 
insofar as it presents itself to a subject; a subject exists insofar as it is present in 
itself. The positioning of the human body as a spatial entity is essential to a 
medium which identifies existence with presence. Dramatic persons exist to the 
extent that they are "seen" so as to establish relations between each other, or with 
the objects, or the stage as a space.34 Beckett finds himself in the impossible 
position of trying to disentangle existence from presence using means already 
defined by the specificity of the theatre. He deals with it by attacking the two 
conditions upon which the theatrical code is structured: the visibility of human 
body on stage, and dialogue. He abolishes both of them and in their place he 
introduces a monologue uttered by a mouth suspended in the air. My argument, 
though, is that these two essential conditions reassert themselves in the end 
without destroying the metadramatic image that Beckett produces. 
"Playing Mouth, the actress is strapped rigidly into a chair high above the 
stage, her head firmly anchored so that the spot can focus unswervingly on her 
mouth."35 This description of the physical conditions under which the actress 
enacts Mouth's part draws attention to the dialectical relation between dramatic 
speech and performance. The actress has to be physically constrained from 
moving in order to deliver her monologue: 
Gesture . . . materializes the dramatic subject and his world by 
asserting their identity with an actual body and an actual space. 
Without simultaneous kinesic markers, language would remain merely 
'ideal' in the theatre . . . just as without the movements whereby he 
'orchestrates' his utterances (Stern 1973, p. 120) the actor cannnot 
physically possess or control his own speech, but is rather determined 
by it (as a simple mouthpiece).36 
This explains Beckett's impossible demand on the actress, that she should 
dispense with gestures so as to release language from materiality, in a medium 
which, by definition, involves the speaker's body in the speech act. The 
important point here is not whether the actress's body is visible or not. What 
counts is that language in the theater would remain "ideal" only on one condition: 
the physical confinement of body and the restriction of movement. That this 
procedure involves difficulties like the ones mentioned above, is pretty clear by 
now. However, Beckett tries to resolve the problem through recourse to certain 
tactics related to the nature of the dramatic language used. He erases all the 
"kinesic markers" which coordinate body and speech. These pertain to the active, 
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almost "dialogic" nature of dramatic language achieved through "references by 
the speakers to themselves as speakers, to their interlocutors as listener-addressees 
and to the spatiotemporal coordinates (the here-and-now) of the utterance itself 
by means of such deictic elements as demonstrative pronouns and spatial and 
temporal adverbs."37 
By eliminating the body from the stage, Beckett destroys all the ostensive 
and spatial relations which could be established by its mere presence. This has 
a direct bearing on the use of demonstratives which cannot function in the void 
since they result from a state of presence and proximity. Demonstratives, by 
referring to objects and people of the actual world, firmly anchor dramatic speech 
in the here-and-now of the utterance. Beckett's text, however, radically opposes 
that discourse which postulates identity and presence as the essence of things. 
The proliferation of "that" and "there" in the place of "this" and "here" in the text 
points to an "elsewhere" other than the stage space and time.38 In the the same 
way Mouth's use of the third person refuses the dramatic dialectic based on the 
"I" and "you" of the utterance. She introduces narrative in place of dialogue. 
Dramatic language, released from the constraints of identity and presence, cannot 
be contained within limits. It is pure in the sense that its body is free from the 
marks inscribed in it by structure. As a result this breakdown of surfaces gives 
rise to the language of schizophrenia. The body, experienced as a "gaping 
depth," has no surface, no limits. "Words . . . lose their meaning, their 
power . . . to express incorporeal effect . . . distinct from the body's actions and 
passions. All words become physical and affect the body immediately."39 
Yet, Beckett' play, still bears within it the essentials of theater however 
vestigial or unobtrusive. These are inscribed in the theatrical image itself. Mouth 
may be delivering a monologue but this does not necessarily mean that the 
monologue does not contain the traces of a dialogue. These become obvious in 
the very act of questioning, since the latter postulates the existence of the Other. 
The "what" and "who" of Mouth might be directed to God. It might also be 
directed to Auditor who seems to listen to her narration precisely because he 
physically responds to it. It is certainly addressed to the audience by virtue of 
the fact that narrating, by definition, is structured in relation to another. What is 
significant here is the very presence of Auditor in the theatrical space. His 
existence completes the circuit of speech (speaker + message = addressee) 
through his physical participation in it. His gestures of "helpless compassion" in 
response to Mouth's narration therefore re-establish a vestigial form of dialogue. 
At the same time, they orchestrate her speech by "punctuating" it. After 
each interruption by Auditor, Mouth resumes her speech in increasing speed and 
vehemence. Auditor's reaction has an emotional effect on Mouth. It is 
significant that the seat of emotion is located precisely in the human body, that 
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same body that Beckett reduced to invisibility and thus absence. The human 
body restores itself on stage through Auditor, who lacks what Mouth has (a 
mouth), but who provides what she does not possess (a body). The body may 
appear, not as whole, but in dismemberment, but it is still visible, it is still there: 
it exists. So, to Beckett's own question whether his play is still theater or not40 
the answer can only be affirmative. It is a drama radically predicated upon 
speech, a theater of a language which, unable to tell a story, enters its own 
destruction. It is finally a savage exploration of the limits of the dramatic code, 
the stretching of the structure to the breaking point. That this subversive practice 
might include the partial reassertion of elements of structure does not invalidate 
in the least its significance. On the contrary, it confirms that subversion can only 
be the result of a dialectic between acceptance and rejection, affirmation and 
denial. 
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